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Abstract—At present, the electronic mail service is probably
the most widespread and commonly used asynchronous way of
exchanging information among people, thanks to its immediacy
and easiness of use. Information delivered through E-mail can
be sensitive or confidential: ensuring the sender’s identity and
providing privacy has become a vital step in stopping spam, fraud
and even more serious crimes. To this aim, public entities have
adopted Certified E-mail systems to manage secure interactions
with citizens.
Digital Terrestrial Television introduced new facilities in the
traditional broadcasting environment, and determined the tran-
sition of several Electronic based-services to Television based-
services. The availability of commercial Set Top Boxes equipped
with network interfaces and smart card readers enables the
provisioning of personalized interactive TV services, requiring
user’s identification and authentication, that still represent open
issues in the TV context. In this paper we discuss the challenges
of a Certified E-mail service over Digital Terrestrial Television,
and present the case study of the Italian Regione Marche, in
which this service is under development to support the remote
request of certificates issued by the public administration. In
particular, our attention is devoted to user authentication and
secure access to the administrative services, addressed through
the use of a Regional Service Card, an interactive application,
and a centralized authentication framework.
Index Terms—Certified E-mail, DVB-T, Authentication, T-
Government, Interactivity
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital Terrestrial Television (DTT) represents the last evo-
lution of a traditional and well known communication tech-
nology enabling the rapid and wide spreading of information,
in an incisive and complete way. Taking into account the
capillary diffusion of television equipments in home premises
and public buildings, and the increasing number of DTT Set
Top Boxes (STBs) sold or rent, DTT is in the position of
becoming an effective mean for the delivery of innovative
applications in the area of public administrative services, that,
at the moment, are provided over the Internet.
Interactive applications for the Digital Terrestrial Televi-
sion may be classified according to different criteria and
requirements. Referring to the information flow defined by
an application, and the service it relates to, it is possible
to have unidirectional, bidirectional, and secure bidirectional
applications.
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Unidirectional applications represent the innovation pro-
vided by the Digital Terrestrial Television, with respect to the
traditional analog service. Interactivity, standardized by the
Multimedia Home Platform (MHP) [1] specifications, gives
the possibility to develop new informative services, designed
from scratch for the DTT platform, but also to extend the
range of usability of the existing ones. As an example, E-
learning services may be moved from the Web world to the
DTT platform, thus originating T-learning applications [2].
The motivations for this transition are manifold: if compared
to their corresponding Web versions, T-services have the
further advantage of being delivered through a communication
medium that, to many people, is significantly more familiar
and easy to use than a PC, because of several different reasons
(low education, scarce knowledge of information technologies,
age). Moreover, T-services can address specific needs of
“weak” social groups, like elderly or less independent people,
people living in rural areas, and so on, by exploiting the
capillary diffusion of TV receivers. In this sense, DTT can
contribute in overcoming the so called digital divide [3], in
many countries and regions where PCs and Internet are still not
widespread, as reported in [4]. Far ahead the basic services of
entertainment and dissemination of information expected from
traditional television, digital TV may be exploited to help the
inclusion of low-income people into the digital world, at low
cost and with high penetration.
The availability of a return channel interface on DTT STBs,
and the corresponding proper design of the STB middleware,
make it possible to establish a bidirectional flow of information
between home TV users and remote servers. Thanks to this
feature, services requiring a two-way interaction, such as so-
cial services (health related services, job offers, assistance for
elderly or disabled people), services related to tourism (hotel
reservations, tickets booking, up-to-date traffic information),
and public utilities, may be provided.
Among the services based on a two-way interaction, a more
specific class comprises services requiring user authentication
and/or data confidentiality, which may be provided by means
of secure bidirectional interactive applications. Thanks to
them, E-commerce, E-business, E-government may be ex-
tended into T-commerce, T-business, T-government [5]. T-
government services, at a National or Regional level, are pro-
vided to manage the interactions between citizens and public
administrations (such as request of certificates, payments). As
they strongly rely on the exchange of personal user data,
suitable means to protect data confidentiality and to ensure
user authentication must be adopted. Since many years the use
of smart cards has assumed a fundamental role, in this sense, in
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the context of E-services. The same may happen in the delivery
of certified services over the DVB-T platform. This paper
focuses on the importance of exploiting the MHP capabilities
in order to allow the adoption of smart cards as a mean for
ensuring confidentiality and strong user authentication. As a
case study, an example of application to a Certified E-mail
service is discussed.
Figure 1 shows the main components of a generic DTT
infrastructure through which T-government services can be
delivered. In a typical Digital Video Broadcasting Terrestrial
(DVB-T) system, Audio and Video (A/V) signals are generated
by a content provider in MPEG-2 format. The MPEG streams
are collected and organized by a network operator in a single
MPEG Transport Stream (TS), through a multiplexer. The
multiplexer receives also another input stream, provided by
an Object Carousel generator Server (also known as MHP
Playout System) [6], containing a service of MHP interactive
applications (named Xlets). By such means, a TV channel
is composed, and can be transmitted at the assigned radio
frequency. The role of the Object Carousel Server is essential
in enriching DTT with MHP contents. At the user’s side, the
MHP compliant STB receives the transmitted MPEG TS, de-
codes the MPEG A/V contents, and, thanks to its middleware,
can execute the interactive applications received. In the case of
T-services, Xlets are essential to handle the STB return channel
interface, which, in its turn, allows the user connection to a
service management operator, i.e. the available interface to
a T-service provider (public administration, health institution,
certified private entity, and so on). The service management
operator shall perform the necessary functions to implement
a bridge between the Web and the TV worlds. As discussed
by Ferretti et al. in [7] and [8], the integration of DTT and
Web requires the development of suitable techniques to allow
the retrieval of Web contents, on the basis of TV watchers’
requests, and the proper presentation of these Web contents in
a format suitable for a TV screen. Finally, the service provider
included in Fig. 1 represents the entity that supplies a service
usually available through a different technology, such as the
Web. In the context of interest, it may be identified with the
public administration. The service management operator may
be physically located inside the same LAN where the service
provider is, or it can be located in a different network, and
connected to the service provider through a Virtual Private
Network (VPN). As a matter of fact, if we are concerned
with user authentication and data confidentiality, these security
services must be supported throughout all the path covered by
the exchanged data.
Besides a network interface, DTT STBs are usually
equipped with Conditional Access (CA) modules and smart
card readers; moreover, the middleware of MHP receivers is
able to interface ISO 7816 [9] compliant smart cards. This
is a key point in the delivery of personalized T-Government
services, for which user authentication is essential. In the
context of the case study discussed in the following, user
identification and authentication can be performed by means
of National or Regional Services Cards (NSC, RSC) [10], or
Electronic Identity Card (EIC) [11], issued and delivered to the





























Fig. 1. A generic DVB-T technological infrastructure
Among the services requiring user identification and au-
thentication, we are interested in Certified E-mail (CE). The
object of this paper is to outline and discuss the technical
issues related to the implementation and delivery of a CE
service over DTT, that emerged during the design of an
experimental service involving the public administration of the
Italian Regione Marche, through the use of an RSC issued
by it, called Raffaello card [12]. Examples of interactive
applications developed to provide E-mail services over DVB-
T already exist [13], by which usability problems have been
already evidenced and solved. This work is consequently
focused on the security related functions, which are to be
supported by an MHP application, in order to allow the use
of CE as an effective mean of interaction among citizens and
public administration.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II briefly presents
the main features of a CE service; Section III deals with
DVB-T STBs middleware, describing the main Application
Program Interfaces (APIs) provided, and focusing on return
channel interfaces and smart card readers. Section IV deals
with the security framework supported by the MHP Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI), and focuses on the possibility to
establish a secure Internet connection over Transport Layer
Security (TLS) protocol. Section V discusses the issues of user
authentication by means of RSC, and smart card management
in MHP; in Section VI, we present a project currently under
development, involving the Raffaello RSC, the Raffaello Mail
Web portal, and an interactive MHP application, named Raf-
faelloMail-Xlet, for a CE service over DVB-T, through which
citizens can issue requests of certificates to the local public
administration. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. CERTIFIED E-MAIL SERVICE
Since several years, E-mail has become a communication
service of great importance, both for personal and business
matters. Besides immediacy and easiness of use, it features the
possibility of sending not only text messages, but also videos,
images and many other file types. Text and attached files
can be related to important information addressed to people,
commercial organizations, institutions, and so on.
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The Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) [14], that han-
dles most of today E-mail services, was designed in the early
1980’s, when the few Internet users were (or were supposed
to be) honest people interested in this new technology, who
expected others to be equally honest. Unfortunately, SMTP
does not provide suited means to counteract identity forgery,
or to authenticate senders. Nowadays, ensuring users’ identity
in an E-mail scenario has become the necessary first step
in stopping spam, fraud, and even more serious crimes. To
answer this demand for user identification and authentication,
CE systems have been developed.
CE systems allow to certify that a message, and all of its
attachments, have been sent and delivered to the mail provider
the recipient is subscribed to, by generating a legal proof of it
(receipt). At the same time, the receiving E-mail provider is
able to certify, with a precise temporal tag, that the message,
and all of its attachments, have been stored in the recipient’s
mail account, or that this process failed. Consequently, a CE
system can avoid identity forgery and message repudiation,
thus being suited to interface citizens and public services
provided by national and local administrations. In other words,
an E-mail message sent through a CE system has the same
legal value of a filed letter, and can effectively replace it.
Obviously, the whole CE process has to be regulated by law.
In the Italian scenario, the main references are Law n. 59/1997
[15], stating that electronic delivery systems are legally usable,
and DPR n. 445/2000 (art. 14) [16], issuing the principles for
the use of electronic delivery systems, and the legal value
of electronic addresses. In 2005, the matter was completely
regulated by the DPR n. 68 [17], defining the characteristics
of an official electronic delivery service, named Certified
Electronic Mail (in Italian, Posta Elettronica Certificata, or
PEC), and ensuring its legal value. More specifically, an E-
mail message is considered:
• sent, when the recipient’s provider, after several checks,
accepts the E-mail and returns a receipt to the sender;
• received, when the message is stored in the E-mail
account of the recipient. Then, the recipient’s provider
returns the sender a receipt of delivery.
CE providers must implement a logging scheme, to track
and store all the system events for 30 months. In the case
a receipt is lost, the logging system can provide a copy of
it, having the same legal validity. If compared to traditional
E-mail, PEC ensures recognition of the sender (that is to say,
the corresponding mail account), integrity of the message sent,
no delivery refusal, and matching between the delivery receipt
and the message sent by the user.
The main differences between PEC and traditional E-mail
are evidenced in Fig. 2. PEC can certify that the message and
its attachments have been stored in the recipient’s mailbox,
can provide authentication of the sender, and generate receipts
having legal value. The sender’s PEC provider, that belongs to
a public registry of certified providers, ensures authentication
and integrity of the message (including its header), and of all
the attachments.
Figure 3 shows the workflows related to a functional scheme
of PEC implemented by means of Web technologies. When a


































Fig. 2. Comparison between traditional E-mail and PEC systems
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Fig. 3. Functional scheme of the interactions between sender and receiver
PEC domains
provider by means of his credentials (stored in his smart card).
If successfully authenticated, the sender can compose his
message and send it, like in a traditional E-mail scenario. At
this point, the sender’s PEC domain has to perform a number
of checks on the message, to avoid viruses or formal mistakes.
If one of these checks fails, the sender is notified through
a suited signed receipt. In the case of successful checks,
the sender’s PEC domain signs the message and forwards it
to the receiver’s PEC domain. Receiver’s PEC domain can
verify authenticity and integrity of the message by the sender’s
PEC domain signature. Further checks are then performed, for
viruses or other security threats; again, if one of them fails,
a signed receipt is forwarded to the sender. In the case of
positive checks, the receiver’s PEC domain stores the message
in the recipient’s mailbox and notifies the sender by means of
a signed and verifiable receipt.
The Italian Regione Marche administration has operated a
Web portal, called Raffaello Mail that includes, among several
services, also a CE (PEC compliant) service. Through the
Raffaello Mail portal, citizens are able to receive and to send






















Fig. 4. Overview of the main MHP software stack components
E-mails from and towards addresses belonging to several CE
providers (e.g. public agencies and administrations). Authen-
ticated access to this portal is performed using a specific
smart card, the Raffaello card, issued by the administration of
Regione Marche. The CE over DTT service described in the
following aims at extending the context of use of the Raffaello
card to DVB-T STBs equipped with smart card readers, by
implementing suited software APIs to extend the MHP support
to RSCs.
III. DVB-T SET TOP BOX MIDDLEWARE ARCHITECTURE
In DVB-T STBs, the middleware can be thought of as an
operating system, that has to manage the available hardware
and software resources, to handle service selection and MPEG
decoding functions, and to execute all the operations related to
Xlets and user interaction, by means of the MHP framework.
All these aspects are strictly related and interoperating. Al-
though MHP, that has a very strong basis in Java technology,
is the element which mostly characterizes STB middleware,
those parts that relate to MPEG are equally important, and
must be integrated into, or interfaced to, the MHP implemen-
tation.
The MHP software stack is a complex and modular ar-
chitecture, whose components can be built on top of one
another: standardized APIs may be used internally, to exploit
the dependencies among the various components. A graphical
overview of the main components in an MHP software stack
is provided in Fig. 4.
The basic MHP APIs can be split into two main sets, one
containing the components related to MPEG streams, the other
providing services built directly on top of the standard APIs
that are included in any Java platform. A detailed discussion
of the MHP middleware structure can be found in [18].
The core of the MPEG-handling APIs is DAVIC’s MPEG
API, that collects the basic components describing MPEG ser-
vices and streams. The Java APIs include graphics components
(AWT, HAVi and DVB UI), a User Interface events compo-
nent, an inter Xlet communication API (typically built on a
proprietary API) and the Return Channel component. In STBs
implementing a Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN)
return channel interface, this is considered a scarce resource
and handled by means of the DAVIC resource notification API.
It may not be the case when using an ADSL return channel
interface. The Conditional Access (CA) component, used to
access and decode scrambled elementary streams, directly
interfaces the MPEG decoder, mainly because of efficiency
issues, as most of the work is carried out in hardware. Another
basic component, though not shown in Fig. 4, is the Resource
Manager, that provides the other components a framework for
sharing scarce resources; it is exposed to applications and other
components through the DAVIC resource notification API.
The Interactive Broadcast and Internet Access profiles of
MHP include support for using a return channel interface in the
receiver, through an MHP application; basically, this is similar
to accessing an IP connection in a classic Java application.
The MHP 1.0.x specification requires support for HTTP 1.0
and DNS over the return channel, on top of the basic TCP and
UDP protocols, but anything else is optional. MHP 1.1 adds
support for HTTPS (i.e. Secure HTTP), but it does not include
any other protocol, such as SMTP or FTP. In order to establish
return channel connections, the MHP middleware stack calls
the standard java.net API; however, this API assumes that
a permanent network connection is available, but this may
not be always the case when dealing with a STB, according
with the return channel interface it may provide. To face these
situations, MHP defines some extensions to the java.net API
in the org.dvb.net.rc package, by means of which Xlets can
set up a PSTN modem and connect to a service provider.
PSTN modems, being a scarce resource, must be reserved for
connection before they can be used; on the contrary, always-
on interfaces are treated as IP connections that applications
can access when needed.
MHP 1.1, originally published in June 2001, introduced
smart card reader APIs, to support a low level communication
with smart cards, and the Internet Access Profile, a set of
Java APIs to support Web browsing and E-mail clients. As
many T-based services, such as T-Government and T-health,
may require identification and authentication of end users,
MHP 1.1.2 adds further features, to access smart cards for
encryption (private keys reside inside the smart card and
never enter the MHP terminal) and user authentication. In
MHP 1.1, the smart card reader API was based on the Open
Card Framework (OCF); later, MHP 1.1.2 has replaced it
with Security And Trust Services API (SATSA) [19], learning
from the experience gained by the use of Java in mobile
terminals. Moreover, OCF did not pass conformance tests, and
presented an unclear and questionable Intellectual Property
Right (IPR) policy. MHP 1.1 only provides optional support
for the SATSA-APDU package, as stated in the ”11.9.4
Not-CA smart card API” section of the ETSI TS 102 812
v1.3.1 specification, that defines the later MHP 1.1.2. The
SATSA-APDU Optional Package enables MHP applications
to communicate with a smart card by exchanging Application
Protocol Data Units (APDUs) defined in [20]. An APDU is a
short message encoded as a byte sequence; SATSA-APDU
enables an Xlet to exchange APDU messages with a card
application.
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IV. SECURITY CAPABILITIES IN MHP
The advent of interactivity through DTT has radically
changed the traditional TV broadcasting service: the final
result is that the DTT architecture can be considered as
a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA), according with the
scenario previously outlined (see Fig. 1).
DVB MHP has defined a security model in [21] Annex 5,
that MHP applications must comply with. This model ensures
smooth MHP operations when supporting privacy, guarding
the MHP implementation against a number of security prob-
lems, without preventing the possibility of efficiently imple-
menting reasonable business models, such as T-commerce
services. In essence, signing MHP applications provides a
guarantee that the applications themselves and their data have
not been modified after signing; the associated certificate
carries details about the entity that signed the application. The
receiver can use the authentication information to determine
what privileges it has to ensure to the application during
its execution, through a fine-grained control of the available
resources, provided by the STB middleware.
It is necessary to remark that this kind of authentication is
useful only to preserve the STB and the end user against possi-
ble hostile applications; it does not provide a technically viable
mechanism for content protection in a unidirectional broad-
cast environment such as the DVB-T one. A T-government
service, like the CE one, needs further capabilities, such as a
secure bidirectional information exchange, i.e. the possibility
of establishing a secure return channel connection through the
Internet, towards the services exposed by remote servers of
public administrations or certified private entities. In this sense,
a general purpose security framework for the return channel
connection can be provided by the TLS protocol [22], which
requires the MHP stack to implement several cipher suites,
such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), Message Digest 5
(MD5), Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1), and Data Encryption
Standard (DES). A more detailed description of the required
suites is given in Table I.
MHP does not mandate the whole TLS implementation: the
TLS server side, the compliance with Secure Socket Layer
(SSL) 3.0, and the TLS client authentication are not required.
Before a TLS connection can be established, to provide secure
transactions of sensitive data, MHP has to ensure that the list
of certificates sent by a server contains at least one trusted
certificate. Assuming that the MHP application knows which
server it has to connect to, there is at least one certificate
against which the application can check that a given certificate
chain contains the expected certificate, that is already known
and trusted.
The MHP specification describes how to install the cer-
tificates at the receiver; they should have a name in the
format dvb.tls.organization id.application id.x, where x is an
optional string to discriminate certificates, when necessary. In
DVB-Java, TLS certificates are placed in the application base
directory. When no TLS certificates are sent together with
the application, the MHP stack implementation will allow any
connection to be established, to any server. The application can
use the Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE) API to retrieve
the certificate chain and check it contains what the application
requires. In such a case, both the name and public keys need
to be checked by the application, to trust the remote server. An
unsigned application may not use the return channel interface;
by default, a signed application may not access the return
channel interface, unless otherwise specified by the permission
request file.
It is important to stress that even if applications use
TLS, data may be not encrypted during transfer. As a
matter of fact, it is possible that confidential data are
transmitted in clear: among the cipher suites required by
MHP (see Table I), TLS RSA WITH NULL MD5 and
TLS RSA WITH NULL SHA do not use encryption, and
an MHP STB may have these options selected by default.
Under these conditions, a TLS server could ask and obtain to
set up an unencrypted session with a STB: it is a quite common
case, as establishing a ciphered connection may be resource-
consuming for a server. So, if data confidentiality is required
during transfer, in order to prevent unencrypted sessions it is
preferable to disable the two options at the decoder, as shown
by the code extract reported in the following. In the case the
server does not negotiate a cipher suite including encryption,








V. USER AUTHENTICATION IN MHP
Public administrative services available through on-line plat-
forms require access procedures that should be secure, easy to
use, and as much general purpose as possible. In order to
favour the convergence among digital identification solutions
similar to EIC, the NSC standard has been released. The NSC
standard acts as a reference when a multi-service card, like an
RSC, is to be issued by a local or national administration. By
means of an NSC/RSC, it is possible to provide health, bank,
postal services and others, to remote users, and univocally
identify each user by means of their digital signature.
The use of NSC/RSC for delivering public services over
the DVB-T platform highlights the problem of integrating
smart cards (the physical support for NSC/RSC) and MHP
DVB-T receivers. Almost all the commercial STBs provide
at least one smart card reader slot: this is “historically” due
to pay-per-view programs and CA systems. CA card readers
are in any way compliant with the physical and electrical
standards of NSC/RSC, i.e. under a hardware standpoint.
The situation is different when dealing with the software
interface to NSC/RSC smart cards, which is different from
that necessary to communicate with CA smart cards. The
former has to comply with the ISO 7816-4 standard [20].
This standard describes the commands, the messages and
the answers exchanged between the smart card and the Card
Acceptance Device (CAD, commonly known as card reader),
the logical structure of files and data stored in the smart card
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TABLE I
CIPHER SUITES SUPPORT REQUIRED IN MHP
Cipher Suite Key Exchange Cipher Hash MHP Status
TLS NULL WITH NULL NULL Null Null Null Required
TLS RSA WITH NULL MD5 RSA Null MD5 Required
TLS RSA WITH NULL SHA RSA Null SHA-1 Required
TLS RSA EXPORT WITH DES40 CBC SHA RSA EXPORT DES40 CBC SHA-1 Required
TLS RSA WITH DES CBC SHA RSA DES CBC SHA-1 Required
TLS RSA WITH 3DES EDE CBC SHA RSA 3DES EDE CBC SHA-1 Required
memory, and the mechanisms to protect the access to them.
Moreover, the standard [20] defines the cryptographic primi-
tives to cipher the communications between the smart card and
the CAD terminal (Secure Messaging). SATSA, selected as the
reference environment for smart card interfacing, is perfectly
compatible with MHP, and has the advantage to make complex
low level communications transparent to software developers.
The RSC issued by the Regione Marche administration is
called Raffaello card. It can be classified among the possible
strong authentication solutions, and allows the user to access
some of the informative services provided by Regione Marche
administration in a secure way, i.e. it assures the user’s identity,
and the fact that the operations associated to the user’s specific
privileges are executed by that user only. The Raffaello card
is consequently an identification device for remote services,
being associated to an authentication certificate, issued by
a public Certification Authority, that has five years validity.
By using the Raffaello card, and its associated Personal
Identification Number (PIN), each user can access available
public administration services, without the need of providing
a username and a password for each service, but simply by
inserting their card in a proper reader. The user’s private PIN
is the Security Data Object used to access the protected file,
called C CARD Elementary File (EF), located inside the Data
Folder DF1. As shown in Fig. 5, it is an Elementary File stored
in the standardized file system structure of the NCS, that con-
tains all the data necessary to identify the user, and to provide
personalized services. The authentication certificate profile is
based on the IETF standards [23], [24]; the common name
subject of the certificate is requested by national regulations,
to provide strong user authentication. This field comprises
the citizen tax identification number, the smart card ID and
the hash calculated over the Personal Data EF. Automatic
reading of this field, and its use during the transactions, avoids
typing the user data by means of the STB remote control keys.
Reading that field is made possible by the SATSA-APDU, an
extension of the Generic Connection Framework (GCF). Using
the GCF, an Xlet requests a connection from a factory Java
class, the javax.microedition.io.Connector; if the connection
is established, the Connector hands the Xlet an object able to
exchange data over the connection, as shown by the following
code sample:
...








In SATSA-APDU, the Xlet passes a locator string, car-
rying an Application ID (AID), to the Connector’s Open()
method, which returns an APDUConnection that can be used
to communicate with the card application. The vast majority
of the card issued in Italy are compliant with the standard,
but are not Java cards. Although an AID could be, in theory,
set also on these cards, this is not mandatory. Any Con-
nector.open(”apdu...;target=a0.00...”) method issued towards
such cards returns a ConnectionNotFound exception. This is
because the card has neither an AID set, nor it is a Java
Card with such a listening application. The solution consists in
defining a new target, namely CXS, for the Connector.open()
method, as Connector.open(”apdu:0,target=”CXS”) in the
sample code. In this case (target = CXS), and only in this case,
if we catch a ”NoCardApplication”, instead of a Connection-
NotFound exception, the SATSA layer can successfully return
an APDUConnection object. At this point, the MHP appli-
cation may continue to exchange APDUs (exchangeAPDU())
and eventually close the connection.
VI. CE OVER DVB-T: A CASE STUDY
The aim of the project described in this section, and
represented by the RaffaelloMail-Xlet, is to migrate a CE
service, currently available on a Web platform, to DVB-T,
so that users can issue requests for certificates to a local
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Fig. 6. Overview of the technological infrastructure involved in the
RaffelloMail-Xlet project
public administration, by means of their home STBs, in a
Trust Access modality. Trust Access modality supplies Internal
Security Services based on user’s identity, with related roles
and privileges, to allow a controlled access to Web based ser-
vices. In practice, the identities of the communicating user and
institution are ensured, respectively, by a strong authentication
procedure over the DTT platform, through the Raffaello RSC,
and by an informative and service infrastructure partly already
available at the Regione Marche institution. More specifically,
the final scenario can be classified as a SOA scenario, where
different subjects and different technologies are integrated, as
shown in Fig. 6.
In the SOA scenario, the user performs authentication using
his Raffaello card, through the interaction with the MHP
RaffaelloMail-Xlet graphic user interface (GUI). Once entered
a page called Authentication Page, the user is requested to
insert his RSC into the STB card reader, and to type the
corresponding PIN, by means of a virtual keyboard shown
by the application on the screen. The Xlet can verify if the
typed PIN is correct or not, by questioning the Raffaello
card. In the positive case, the Xlet will start a handshake
procedure to establish a TLS communication session over
a PSTN or Ethernet interface, with an external Web server
called Service Manager, that acts as a Content Management
Service (CMS), to handle the interaction of the STB with the
Internet world. The handshake process is transparent to the
user, and completely managed by the Xlet through proper Java
instructions.
Once the secure connection is established, the Xlet transfers
the user’s identity data, read from the Raffaello RSC, to the
Service Manager. The Service Manager establishes a VPN
connection to the Authentication Server Cohesion [25], by in-
voking a particular synchronous WebService. Cohesion repre-
sents the core element to access all the available authenticated
services offered by the Regione Marche administration, and
supported by means of the Raffaello RSC. Cohesion checks
the user’s rights of accessing the Raffaello Mail Service, by
addressing a query to the User Profiles Database of the RSC
project, and gives back the corresponding Simple Object Ac-
cess Protocol (SOAP) answer. The Service Manager processes
the SOAP answer, formats it in a suited XML syntax for the
RaffaelloMail-Xlet, and transmits it back to the STB, again
over the secure TLS connection set up during the initial phase.
These formatting operations are necessary to ensure a correct
exchange of data between the Service Manager and the user
side, represented by the STB and the MHP application. As
discussed in [7], Web contents need proper transcoding in
order to be accessible on the DTT platform.
The RaffaelloMail-Xlet parses the received XML file. In
the case the SOAP answer was positive, the user is authorized
to send an E-mail for requesting his certificates to the public
administration. In order to simplify the process of writing texts
by means of a remote control, the Xlet provides the user with
a wizard procedure, to guide him in filling in all the empty
and editable fields in the GUI. Given the specific context of
application, there are some limitations on the number of fields
that may be edited by the user, and on the textual information
the user can type, with respect to a traditional E-mail written
through a Web interface. The user cannot select the recipient of
the certified E-mail message arbitrarily: he is allowed to make
a selection in a preconfigured scrolling list, which corresponds
to the public list of the trusted certified institutions, recognized
and regularly updated by the Regione Marche administration.
Depending on the selection performed, the user can choose the
type of certificate he needs in a limited set of options, then
enter the Editor Page. In this MHP page, thanks to editing
functionalities developed ad hoc, the user can write, rather
quickly, the text of the E-mail by pressing the remote control
keys.
Finally, once the SEND button on the GUI is pressed, the
RaffaelloMail-Xlet starts another set of workflows to transfer
the edited contents to the Service Manager, that, in its turn,
contacts the Certified Mail Server. If no problems arise, the
Mail Server, complying with the rules of a CE System,
transfers the E-mail to the right recipient. Also in this case
all the data exchanged pass through a secure connection. In
the case the whole authentication procedure fails, or the STB
is not able to connect to the Cohesion server through the
Service Manager, a message will be shown to the home user,
and the Xlet will pause in the Authentication Page. A similar
procedure is performed when the user wants to check his
InBox through the RaffaelloMail-Xlet. A screenshot of the
interactive application GUI, through which the user can check
incoming mails, is shown in Fig. 7. As in a traditional E-mail
service, attachments could be sent to the user, together with the
mail body. Limitations on the nature of the attached files are
obviously due to the specific platform on which the service is
provided. As a consequence, when dealing with CE over DVB-
T, the only attachments which may be properly displayed by
the final user are text and image files, the latter according to the
formats admitted by MHP (i.e. JPG, PNG, BMP). Restrictions
on the greatest admitted dimension for the received mails
and attachments exist, usually stronger than those imposed
by E-mail servers on the Web. They are basically due to
the technological limitations of the STBs available on the
market, which are expected to improve in the future. As a
RASCIONI et al.: DELIVERY OF A CERTIFIED E-MAIL SERVICE 119
Fig. 7. A screenshot of the RaffaelloMail-Xlet GUI: the InBox page
final remark, latencies in the order of some seconds may be
experienced by the user, when the MHP application performs
the authentication process. They are associated to the instruc-
tions executed in order to query the RSC for user’s private
data. Even though a latency of some seconds may appear quite
annoying, it is important to remember that such operations are
executed only once, during the secure connection setup phase;
moreover, latencies of similar amount have been obtained by
testing the application on different STBs, thus indicating they
are associated to processing limitations of the CA modules
currently available.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper discussed the main issues to face when migrating
a Web based certified service, such as Certified E-mail, to the
DVB-T platform, in order to exploit the interactive capabilities
it offers, through the smart card support provided by MHP.
The final aim is to allow the TV user to issue requests for
certificates towards institutions of the public administration
directly from his home premise, through the DTT STB; any
communication session takes place in a secure way, thanks to
suited identification, authentication and ciphering mechanisms.
The security framework necessary to ensure a certified service
is established by means of suitable APIs, through which DTT
STBs can interface Regional and National Services Cards, to
provide user identification and authentication. A case study
involving the centralized authentication framework of the
Italian Regione Marche administration, the RSC issued by
it, and an interactive MHP Xlet developed ad hoc, has been
presented.
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